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Understanding the Chaos of Airline Pricing
Abstract
Airline pricing is so distorted that often a full-fare paying passenger is seated next to a passenger who
paid more then three hundred percent less for his or her ticket. What makes this situation so exasperating
is that each passenger is receiving the same quality of seat and in-flight service, regardless of the airfare
each paid. This paper will attempt to uncover the forces that have created this chaotic pricing system that
has confused and annoyed passengers in today’s air travel industry.
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Understanding the Chaos of Airline
Pricing
By Alex Kons
I. INTRODUCTION
“The airline industry’s pricing system is a
billion-dollar house of cards in which every
customer is a futures speculator and Economics 101
is turned onto its head” (Fredrick, 1995). This
statement highlights one of the most hidden
frustrations that many air travelers feel. Airline
pricing is so distorted that often a full-fare paying
passenger is seated next to a passenger who paid
more then three hundred percent less for his or her
ticket. What makes this situation so exasperating
is that each passenger is receiving the same quality
of seat and in-flight service, regardless of the airfare
each paid. This paper will attempt to uncover the
forces that have created this chaotic pricing system
that has confused and annoyed passengers in today’s
air travel industry.
Very few other industries have undergone
anything like the drastic changes that have rocked
the U.S. domestic airline industry in the past twenty
years. Over this time period, the industry has
evolved from a system of long established airlines
flying a regulated route structure to a dynamic, free
market environment where new airlines emerged
and disappeared seemingly overnight. Recently the
industry has become more characterized by massive
market dominance by a small group of major
airlines. Given its past volatility, there is little doubt
that the industry will continue to transform over
time. All the while, air travelers have continued to
seek an understanding of all the chaos.
The focus of this paper will be on developing
a model that demonstrates the effect two specific
exogenous shocks had in creating the airline
industry’s current pricing system of vast airfare
dispersion amongst passengers on the same flight.
The model developed establishes that certain airlines
have used market segmentation and price
discrimination tactics as a result of these exogenous
shocks. The organization of this paper is as follows.

Section II provides historical background into the
airline industry before 1979 when drastic changes
began to occur. Section III develops a model for
airline pricing on the basis of monopolistic
competition in order to describe the determinants of
the airfare charged for a given flight. Section IV
builds from the model to describe the theoretical
framework that leads to the hypothesis of the use of
market segmentation and price discrimination in the
airline industry. Section V presents historical
analysis of the post-deregulation period in order to
better understand the evolution of the current price
system. Section VI breaks the mechanisms used by
airlines to segment their customers and then provides
empirical evidence of the use of price discrimination
on routes between Atlanta and three separate cities.
Section VII finishes with concluding remarks.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Volatility in airfares is a relatively new
phenomenon in the airline industry. Since air
travel’s creation, U.S. airlines had been subject to
government regulation similar to that of public
utilities. In 1938, Congress passed the Civil
Aeronautics Act, which gave regulatory power to
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to oversee the
airline industry. The main purpose of this act was
to keep sound economic conditions in the industry
since it provided for the public’s welfare. The CAB
had the responsibility to regulate the following areas:
market entry, rate determination, and antitrust
authority. This allowed the CAB to determine which
routes airlines would fly and establish airfares at
rates the CAB found reasonable. Additionally, the
CAB sought to prevent harmful alliances between
airlines and stop any other forms of anti-competitive
behavior between airlines (Dempsy & Gotz, 1992).
Regulation initially created a favorable
environment and a group of established airlines
arose and became known as the trunk carriers. For
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the next 40 years, the 11 trunk carriers provided
87% of the air travel needs of the United States
(Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan, 1991). Over this time
period, the CAB consistently kept fares higher than
the market level and severely restricted entry of new
competition. As a result, the trunk carriers were
more than willing to exist with each other as long
as they continued to make consistent profits.
Yet by the 1970’s the trunk carriers all were
operating at record losses. The main reason for this
was that the trunk carriers had ordered large
numbers of new jet aircraft in order to prepare for
forecasted booms in passenger demand. However,
the recession of the early 1970’s slowed demand
for air travel, which along with the high cost of these
new jets created prolonged losses for the trunk
carriers. Many airline executives pushed the blame
on the CAB since it was an easy scapegoat, even
though fault really lay with the airlines themselves
(Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan 1991).
While this problem persisted in the industry,
opposition by lawmakers to the CAB began to form
out of concern that the airline industry needed to be
more competitive. Many began to advocate that
the CAB had failed to provide for public welfare
because it had created a monopolistic industry with
inflated airfares. Unfortunately for the CAB, ample
proof for this claim existed. For example, a group
of interstate airlines had grown to provide more
affordable air travel on their flights. These airlines
were not subject to CAB authority as long as they
flew within only one state. The most famous of
these interstate airlines was Southwest Airlines,
which flew in Texas. Southwest competed with
trunk carriers on many routes and charged fares
significantly lower, which generated greater air
travel demand. More importantly, Southwest was
also consistently profitable (Bailey, Graham, and
Kaplan, 1991).
The prolonged stagnation of established
airlines and the demand for more affordable air
travel lead to the passing of the Airline Deregulation
Act in 1979. The result of this act was complete
elimination of the CAB’s authority, leaving the
airline industry in a free market. Almost
immediately, a number of new airlines arose to
compete with the trunk carriers and the industry
16
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would be changed forever (Glab and Peterson,
1994).

III. DEVELOPING THE MODEL
To understand the roots of chaotic pricing
in the airline industry, it is necessary to know the
unique nature of competition that exists in the
industry. In order to develop the most coherent
model for airline pricing determination, the industry
is modeled in terms of monopolistic competition.
This firm model applies to industries with a large
number of firms that have some degree of product
differentiation. Additionally, this model assumes
that there are few barriers to entry and that some
amount of brand loyalty exists (Mansfield, 1997).
As a whole, the airline industry follows the
monopolistic competition model quite well. The
barriers to starting an airline are actually relatively
small when compared to many industries. Initial
start-up costs of an airline are expensive, but
sufficient financing has always been readily
available to fund these costs. Also, airlines often
do not own their airplanes, favoring instead to take
advantage of the lower initial costs of leasing aircraft
for short periods. Finally, passengers tend to develop
some degree of brand loyalty towards one airline,
especially when compensated for their loyalty, such
as with frequent flyer programs (O’Conner, 1995).
In this paper, airlines will be classified based
on two different strategic groups in order to analyze
competition. The notion of two strategic groups in
the airline industry is based on Margaret Peteraf’s
work, which classified an airline as belonging to
either the major airline group or the low-cost airline
group. These two groups have many key differences
in their competitive structure.
Large networks of flights and billions of
dollars in revenue characterize the major airlines.
Low-cost airlines on the other hand fly only a limited
number of routes and obtain far less revenue than
the majors. Another difference between the two
groups lies in their cost structures. Major airlines
have highly unionized workforces and the most
expensive airport facilities, while low-cost airlines
are non-unionized and always focus on cost effective
facilities. As the name implies, low-cost airlines
hold a significant cost advantage over the major

Understanding the Chaos of Airline Pricing
airlines. Another important difference is that major
amenities that the major airlines emphasize play
airlines offer more passenger amenities than their
very minor roles in determining the airline
low-cost counterparts. This implies such items as
passengers chose. According to William O’ Conner,
in-flight meals, roomy seats, and frequent flyer
“The speed, comfort, and safety aspects of the
programs. Low-cost airlines focus solely on offering
journey are more likely to be much the same,
the most cost effective travel to their customers. Also
whichever airline a passenger selects” (1995 p.5).
the major airlines are all well established with steady
The primary reason passengers select a particular
operating histories, such as American Airlines,
airline is based on the cheapest airfare and the most
which has existed for 80 years. On the other hand
convenient departure and arrival times. As a result,
low-cost airlines often initiate and leave markets so
airlines typically will match each other’s fares on
rapidly that they barely make long-term impacts on
competitive routes, but attempt to gain more
passenger flows. In fact, no member of the lowpassengers than their competitors by offering more
cost group has even been in
flights on the route. This
business longer than thirty
maximizes the likelihood
years (Peteraf, 1993).
that passengers will get their
...low cost airlines often
To develop an
preferred flight times. To
initiate and leave markets
effective model for pricing,
passengers this form of
there are certain aspects
differentiation is not easily
so
rapidly
that
they
barely
unique to the airline
perceived, because it does
make
long-term
impacts
industry that will be
not involve the comfort of
incorporated to the
their seat or price of the
on
passenger
flows.
monopolistic competition
ticket (O’Conner, 1995).
model. First, airlines
The final unique
demonstrate the tendency
aspect of the airline industry
to form monopolies or
and perhaps most important
oligopolies on certain routes between two cities. It
is that the total cost for providing a flight is almost
is important to note that this does not affect the
solely determined by the airline’s fixed costs.
assumption of low barriers to market entry in the
Regardless of the flight, the two principal costs are
model because this type of monopolization does not
jet fuel and the labor costs of the crew. Passenger
prevent new competition in the short-run. It may
amenities constitute most of the variable costs, but
be possible for new entrants to compete on a route
these represent such a small portion of total costs
with a monopolizing airline, but often new entrants
that they are insignificant. In other words, the
do not survive in the long-term due to antiaverage total cost of a given flight is almost entirely
competitive tactics used by established airlines.
determined by the average fixed costs (O’Conner,
Many airlines successfully monopolize specific
1995).
geographic areas of the country by concentrating
Drawing on this aspect, it can be concluded
their flights from a large city to surrounding cities.
that the marginal cost of an additional passenger on
This tactic is known as the hub and spoke system.
a flight is irrelevant. Since total costs are almost
For example, since Northwest Airlines operates over
entirely made up of fixed costs, the airline pays for
seventy percent of the total flights out of Detroit,
the production costs of a full flight regardless of how
the airline’s monopoly on many flights allows it to
many passengers are actually on a flight. For
charge on average a 46% premium to its passengers
example, if the average total cost to seat each
(http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation).
passenger remains approximately $1000, then the
The second unique aspect to consider is that
marginal cost of seating 50 versus 100 people on
passengers always value price of airfare and travel
the airplane is almost zero. However, a flight that
time convenience over any form of product
departs with empty seats represents lost revenue
differentiation. The higher qualities of in-flight
since the airline has already paid the costs to provide
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the seat (Dempsy & Goetz, 1992).
Taking these factors into consideration, the
model developed to demonstrate airline fare
determination for a flight must differ from how
monopolistic competition determines price. Most
importantly, the airline’s choice of fare cannot be
determined through the standard monopolistic
competition model that dictates that the intersections
of the marginal cost and marginal revenue curves
determines the price the firm should charge. The
reason for this is that the marginal revenue and cost
curves do not intersect in this paper’s model because
of the assumption that the marginal costs of each
additional passenger is insignificant for the airline.
Since marginal cost and revenue serve no important
role in this industry, they are eliminated from this
model.
When an airline decides to offer a flight
between two cities, it must first determine what sized
airplane to use on the route. In the model of airline
price determination, three different-sized categories
of airplanes are used to demonstrate this decision.
In Figure 1, ATC1 and Q1 represent costs and
seating capacities of 50 to 70 passengers, which
consists of small turboprop airplanes. ATC2 and
Q2 correspond cost and capacity of airplanes
holding 120 to 150 passengers, such as the Boeing
737. Finally, ATC3 and Q3 symbolize larger
airplanes cost and seating of 200 to 260 passengers

such as the Boeing 767 or McDonnell. Note that
each ATC curve has its own distinct shape in order
to represent its specific airplane type.
This model assumes that through adequate
market research an airline can determine demand
level for each flight, which allows construction of
the demand curve in Figure 2. By comparing the
demand curve with the average total cost curves for
each airplane type, the airline can determine which
size airplane will maximize profits for a given flight.
As shown in Figure 2, the airline will choose Q2 as
the airplane to operate because this airplane provides
the greatest total area of profit of the three Q levels.
The airline then uses Q2 to price off the demand
curve, which establishes the appropriate single fare
to charge. The model developed in this paper
concludes that the airline’s choice of Q-level leads
to the determination of the fare charged. For the
remainder of this paper, Q2 will be assumed to be
the profit maximizing level of quantity.

IV. EFFECT OF SHOCKS AND
HYPOTHESIS OF MARKET
SEGMENTATION AND PRICE
DISCRIMINATION
Now that the model has been developed to
explain airline price determination, it will be
demonstrated how airline pricing has been shaped
by two key exogenous shocks. The effect of

Figure 1: ATC Curves for Q1, Q2, & Q3

Figure 2: Determining Q Level for Flight
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Quantity of Seats Offered
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Q3

Q2
Qunatity of Seats Offered

Legend:
F 1= Airfare charged for Q1 level
F 2= Airfare charged for Q2 level
F 3= Airfare charged for Q3 level
D 1= Demand Curve for individual flight

Q3
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costs when compared to the low-fare airline. Yet,
the low-cost airline can make a profit at this new
price level through its lower cost advantage. If it
were not for the cost advantage shown in ATCL,
new competition would not have entered the market
and decreased the demand curve because airlines
would not have been able to cover their average costs .
The second major exogenous shock that
affected the airline industry’s pricing came into effect
at the same time as deregulation, which was the
information technology revolution and the
development of the computer reservation system.
During the 1960’s, the major airlines had worked
to develop a computerized system that would allow
them to know the flight details of any passenger on
any of its routes. At first, these systems were seen
more as means to boost labor productivity by
making it easier to handle large amounts of
reservations (Williams, 1994). Yet, by the mid1970’s, the airlines began to see that a reservation
system had potential as a valuable tool to increase
the number of passengers. Therefore, the airlines
joined together and attempted to create an unbiased
industry-wide system. However, the government
overturned this attempt on the grounds of anti-trust
violation. As a result, the five largest airlines each
committed to creating their own reservation systems

government regulation for one flight on the model
is shown in Figure 3. By setting airfares above the
market clearing level, the government prevents the
airline on this route from filling all seats up to Q2.
Yet, as long as competition is kept out on this flight,
the demand curve is kept artificially high and the
airline is content to fly with a partly full airplane at
QR. The reason for this is that the airline is still
making a constant profit despite not filling every
seat because of the CAB keeping demand high by
restricting competition. This characterizes the longterm stability for the major airlines that existed under
regulation.
This steady environment was radically
altered by the first exogenous shock to the model,
which was the deregulation of the airline industry.
The effect this has on the model is shown in Figure
4. Taking away the government’s barriers to entry
allowed for low-cost airlines to enter markets and
compete with the major airlines. The entry of this
new competition shifts the demand curve from D1
to D2, which causes profits for the major airlines to
disappear. This demand shift caused by the entry
of low-cost airliners causes the fare in this market
to decrease from FR to FD. This lower airfare
makes it impossible for the major airline to cover
its average costs because of the higher nature of their

Figure3: Effect of
Government Regulation

Figure 4: Entry of Low
-Cost Competition

Fare

Fare

FR
F2

FR

FD

D1
ATC 2

D1
ATC 2

D2
ATC L

QR
Q2
Quantity of Seats Offered
Legend:
Q2- quantity offered by airline
QR- quantity filled as a result of government price setting
F2- airfare as determined by market
FR- airfare as determined by government intervention

Quantity of Seats Offered

Q2

Legend:
D 1- demand curve that existed before Deregulation Act
D 2- demand curve as a result of new competition
ATC 2-average total cost curve for major airline
ATC L-average total cost curve for low-cost airline
FR- previous airfare under regulation
FD-airfare created by deregualtion
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at the same time the Deregulation Act was passed
(Glab and Peterson, 1994).
As Figure 4 indicates, the influx of low-cost
airlines brought forth by deregulation created a very
unfavorable environment for the major airlines. The
low-cost airlines could compete directly with the
major airlines on a given route, fill all seats at a
reduced fare, and still make a profit. The major
airlines’ attempts to leave fares at the higher price
in hopes that passengers would appreciate the higher
service level of the majors proved impractical
because, as discussed before, passengers value the
lowest airfare over any amenity. What many of the
major airline executives were failing to recognize
was that deregulation had created an environment
where a major airline charging a single price on a
route would not allow profitability. This notion
combined with characteristics unique to the airline
industry made it necessary for the major airlines to
segment their passengers on each flight according
to each one’s willingness to pay and then use price
discrimination methods to steal consumer surplus.
This method of maximizing the price each passenger
paid for their ticket could allow the major airlines
to make profits despite the cost advantage held by
the low-cost airlines.
In order to understand this concept of
segmenting each passenger on a flight, it must first
be made clear that each passenger on a flight has
different reasons for travel. For example, a business
traveler often has no advance warning concerning
when he or she will travel and has a strong necessity
to get to where he or she is going as expediently as
possible. Therefore, this group of travelers has a
very low price elasticity, which means they are more
willing to pay a higher airfare in order to guarantee
travel on a specific flight that would be needed for
their travel itinerary. Contrast this type of passenger
with a vacationer who has had advance knowledge
of their vacation period and does not have a strong
urge to get to their destination at any specific time.
Thus, vacationers will have high price elasticity and
fervently value price before convenient flight times.
These two types of travelers represent the two
extremes of air travelers with various other groups
having price elasticities somewhere in-between. In
reality, an airline continually attempts to segment
20
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the market for one flight as much as possible if the
willingness to pay is known. Predicting this out of
so many potential travelers would be a daunting task
if it were not for the use of computer reservation
systems to provide the key to this information.
Through research into a flight and effective use of a
reservation system, a major airline obtains the ability
to predict the willingness to pay of each passenger
on the airplane.
Once the willingness to pay for each
passenger is determined, the airline can then adjust
fares according to the types of passengers purchasing
tickets. This results in groups of travelers with lower
price elasticities paying a higher airfare than those
with higher price elasticities, which clearly
represents price discrimination. The form of price
discrimination practiced here falls somewhere
between first and second-degree discrimination. In
first-degree discrimination, the firm is specifically
aware of the price that consumers are willing to pay
for the seat and thus can maximize the consumer
surplus taken from their customers (Botimer, 1996).
This serves as the goal of the major airlines and is
partly attained by using computer reservation
system, yet the sheer number of potential customers
for a flight makes first-degree unobtainable. Seconddegree discrimination allows the firm to take some,
but not the entire consumer surplus by offering a
few, well-defined pricing categories. The airlines
create so many different classes of prices that most
consumer surplus is taken, thus making this form
of price discrimination stricter than second-degree
(Botimer, 1996). The large size of potential
customers makes first-degree impractical, but the
vast number of prices possible with computerized
reservations allow the airlines to obtain more
consumer surplus than second-degree discrimination
offers.
Previous studies have examined the vast
dispersion in airfare prices that exists for passengers
on a given route. One of these aimed specifically at
this paper’s notion that a key linkage between price
dispersion and discrimination exists. The work of
Borenstein and Rose used Gini coefficients as
measures of dispersion and revealed two key
findings. First, they found that price dispersion was
inversely related to how much market share an
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airline has on a given route. In other words, an
exists to this day.
airline is less likely to offer a range of airfares if it
V. ANALYSIS OF THE POSTcarries most of the passengers on a route. This is
DEREGULATION ERA
evidence that monopolization of a route makes price
discrimination unneeded for an airline. The second
To properly understand the effect low-cost
finding was that airport dominance and the lower
airlines had in shaping competition, it is necessary
concentrations of tourist traffic both decrease price
to examine the strategies of these firms in more
dispersion. Airport dominance implies an airline
detail. Probably the most interesting of these airlines
offering a significant number of flights, which
to analyze is People Express which began operations
increases
the
in April, 1981.
likelihood of the
The airline’s
Figure 5: Use of Segmentation to Steal Consumer
airline having
plan was to
Surplus
monopoly routes.
focus on high
Fare
Since tourists
frequency, low
F1
represent a highly
cost air travel
F2
elastic passenger
on the East
F3
a
group, an airline is
Coast, which
F4
b
c
less likely to be
had been an
d
F5
able to use price
underdeveloped
discrimination
market under
tactics in order to
regulation.
draw consumer
From the start,
surplus.
This
People Express
Q2
study’s principal
set out to keep
Quantity of Seats Offered
Legend:
conclusion agrees
operational
area a: consumer surplus taken from passengers paying F1
with that of this
costs at the bare
area b: consumer surplus taken from passengers paying F2
area c: consumer surplus taken from passengers paying F3
paper, which is that
minimum. The
area d: consumer surplus taken from passengers paying F4
most of the
a i r l i n e
dispersion
in
concentrated its
operations out of Newark Airport, which at the time
airfares is linked to price discrimination tactics used
offered very low facility costs and also provided
by airlines (Borenstein and Rose, 1994).
convenient access to New York City. People
The practice of market segmentation
Express’s aircraft were leased for short time periods,
followed by successful price discrimination served
as the means for the major airlines to compete
thus saving on the high cost of new aircraft.
Employees were all non-unionized and often worked
successfully with low-cost airlines in the
multiple positions, such as both flight attendant and
deregulation era. By offering low fares, customers
ticket agent. Additionally, passenger comforts were
who only will pay lower prices can be obtained.
These fares are offset with passengers who pay
limited by requiring passengers to pay for amenities
such as baggage check-in and in-flight beverages
higher fares, in order to allow the airline to make a
(Peterson and Glab 1994).
profit despite some fares being below average costs.
This bare minimum cost structure allowed
Figure 5 demonstrates the use of this system. Five
People Express to charge fares significantly lower
categories of fares are used in this case, each
than the major airlines, allowing the airline to hold
designed to steal consumer surplus from five
a crucial advantage in competing with the majors.
different groups of passengers based on their
For example, when People initiated service from
elasticites. The environment of deregulation and
Newark to Norfolk, it offered a one-way fare of $35.
the computer reservation system created this system,
The only fare offered up to this point by the
which explains the origin of the price dispersion that

The Park Place Economist / vol. VIII

21

Kons
incumbent major airline US Air had been $82. The
entry of People Express forced US Air to drop its
fare to $35. Even matching fares could not help
US Air compete and shortly after the airline ceased
flying the route and diverted its resources to routes
without low-cost competition (Glab and Struken,
1994). The situation faced by US Air on this route
precisely follows the predictions of Figure 4. US
Air simply could not cover its average costs at the
low fare that People Express was able to charge,
thus causing it to stop flying from New York to
Norfolk. This example typifies the reaction of most
major airlines to entry by low-cost airlines. It was
possible for the majors to battle the low-cost airlines
by taking short-term losses in hopes of outlasting
the low-cost competition in the long run. However,
most majors instead chose to pull out or reduce
service on routes with low-cost competition. The
majors also tried ineffectively to slice their costs by
retiring less efficient jets and furloughing workers,
but it proved impossible to bring average costs down
to the level of the low-cost airlines. Industry analysts
at the time compared the majors to lumbering
dinosaurs, doomed for extinction (Glab & Struken,
1994).
As the problems continued for the majors,
People Express and other low-cost carriers continued
to enter more routes as profits rose. In fact, by the
summer of 1984, People Express was the fastest
growing company in American history at the time.
The major airlines were finally beginning to see that
the old system of pricing with one standard fare was
not going to allow profitability (Glab & Struken,
1994). At first, the major airlines tried tinkering
with the old system in order to induce more revenues.
For example, United Airlines ran one promotion in
late 1982 where coupons for reduced ticket prices
were given to passengers during flights. This
represented a primitive attempt by United to segment
their passengers into frequent and new customers
and price discriminate against new customers
(LaCroix, 1984). As was the case with most of these
methods created by the majors, coupons failed to
remedy the profitability problems faced by United.
As the problems continued for the major
airlines, the technological revolution was creating
an explosive growth in the major airlines’ computer
22
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reservation systems. The new competition sparked
by deregulation had brought about so many new
airlines and flights that passengers could no longer
rely on the airlines to determine the best fare for a
flight. It is important to note that each system’s
database listed all possible airline flights regardless
of whether an airline owned the reservation system.
This was necessary because many passengers had
to make connections between flights on two different
airlines to meet their travel needs. The number of
travel agencies using reservation systems soon
turned out to be crucial in the post-deregulation
environment. The competitive advantage that
computer reservation systems provided for the major
airlines soon became readily apparent (Williams,
1994).
As a result of consumer demand, travel
agencies soon became the consumer source for
unbiased flight information. To meet the demands
of travel agencies for fast access of all available
airline information, airlines that owned computer
reservation systems actively marketed their units to
the agencies. Figure 6 demonstrates the massive
growth in travel agencies in the aftermath of
deregulation, which was accompanied by almost all
agencies using computer reservation systems. As
shown, the number of travel agencies grew over
150% and almost every one used a computer
reservation system. The most popular systems were
American’s SABRE and United’s Apollo, which
collectively controlled over half of the total number
held by travel agencies (Williams, 1994). The
importance of an airline owning its own reservation
system at this time cannot be overstated. “An inhouse CRS has provided airline managers with a
degree of clarity about the demand for various
offerings that one would ordinarily associate with
the hypothetical examples contained in
microeconomic textbooks” (Williams, 1994). The
growth of CRS gave the major airlines the
mechanism, in which to know their customer’s
willingness to pay, which allowed the use of
discriminatory pricing.
The major airline’s response to the low-cost
competition finally arrived on January 18, 1985,
when American Airlines announced that one out of
every three seats would be sold at heavily discounted
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prices. The new fare called the Ultimate Super Saver
matched the fares of low-cost airlines on every route
where they competed with American. This single
act took away the vital advantage that low-cost
airlines had been exploiting over the majors, which
was that they could make profits at low airfares.
The key to the new Ultimate Super Saver was that
it carried a number of purchase restrictions that
prevented it from being the accessible to passengers
at any given moment. By using their CRS to
estimate elasticity levels, American could alter the
number of discounted seats offered as demand
changed. Other airlines with reservation systems
soon followed American’s strategy and the system
of pricing that exists today was in-place (Glab &
Struken, 1994). This system has become known as
yield management, which represents nothing more
then a technical term for successful market
segmentation followed by price discrimination.
Although no one predicted it at the time, the
adoption of yield management became the prime
cause of the downfall of the low-cost airlines. With
yield management in place, the major airlines could
compete with the low-cost airlines at lower prices,
yet still make profits due to the revenue generated
from higher fares obtained from passengers who
could not obtain discount fares. As predicted in the
model, these passengers were typically business
travelers that were more willing to pay for the
convenient schedules offered by the majors.
Passenger choice almost always went with the major
airlines, because they tended to offer more flights
on their routes and also offered better passenger

amenities (Glab & Struken, 1994). The results of
yield management are best demonstrated in Figure
7, which shows the entry and exit of low-cost airlines
by year. Note that almost every low-fare airline
was gone by 1986, which was only a year after
American initiated its yield management system.
No other low-fare airline left in such
spectacular fashion as People Express. At the start
of 1986, the airline became the sixth largest airline
in the country and even had international service to
Europe. Yet, in the next two quarters People Express
lost over one hundred million dollars and soon was
bankrupt by the late spring. The principle reason
for People Express’ dramatic collapse was due to
the loss of its customers to the low prices generated
by the majors’ yield management systems. It took
a little over a year for People Express to go from an
airline with a limitless future to bankruptcy. People
Express was bought out by Texas Air Corporation
in January of 1987 and merged into Continental
Airlines. Coincidently, airfares immediately began
to go up on routes that People Express had served
(Dempsey & Goetz, 1992). The collapse of People
Express demonstrates just how powerful the weapon
of market segmentation and price discrimination
was in helping the major airlines crush their lowcost competition.
VI. APPLICATION OF MODEL
A. Understanding Purchase Restrictions
Thus far, historical evidence has been
provided to describe the adoption of market
segmentation and discriminatory pricing tactics by

Figure 6: Growth of Travel Agencies and Computer Reservation Systems
CRS Market Shares in 1985

Year

No. of Agents

% with CRS
System

Vendor(s)

% of
% of Agency
Locations generated revenues

1977

13454

5

1979

16112

24

Sabre

American

35

46

1981

19203

59

Apollo

United

24

28

1983

2 3 0 59

85

Pars

TWA/Northwest 13

10

1985

27193

90

System One Texas Air

17

10

1987

2 9 3 70

95

Datas II

10

5

Delta
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Figure 7: Results of Low-Cost Airlines
Carrier

Year of Entry Year of Exit

Reason for Exit

Air California

1979

1987

Acquired by American

Air Florida

1979

1984

Bankruptcy

Pacific Southwest

1979

1987

Acquired by US Air

Southwest

1979

Former Intra- state Airlines

Former Charter Airlines
Capitol

1979

1984

Bankruptcy

World

1979

1985

Withdrew from
scheduled services

Air Atlanta

1984

1987

Bankruptcy

Air One

1983

1984

Bankruptcy

American International

1982

19 8 4

Bankruptcy

America West

1983

Brainiff

1984

19 8 9

Bankruptcy

Florida Express

1984

1988

Acquired by Brainiff

Hawaii Express

1982

1983

Bankruptcy

Jet America

1981

1987

Acquired by Alaska

MGM Grand

1987

Midway

1979

19 9 1

Bankruptcy

Midwest Express

1984

Muse

1981

1985

Acquired by Southwest

Northeastern

1983

1985

Bankruptcy

Pacific East

1982

1984

Bankruptcy

Pacific Express

1982

1984

Bankruptcy

People Express

1981

1986

Acquired by Texas Air

Presidential

1985

1989

Bankruptcy

Regent Air

1985

1986

Bankruptcy

Newly Formed Carriers

Source: Williams 16
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the major airlines. It is now necessary to describe
the mechanisms the major airlines have used to
ensure that only passengers with low willingness to
pay obtain discounted airfares. After all the entire
goal of yield management fails to be met if
passengers with high willingness to pay end up
purchasing cheaper tickets. To alleviate this
problem the major airlines developed a system of
restrictions on discounted tickets that has prevented
this from occurring. Essentially, a fare restriction
acts as a fence to prevent passengers with higher
willingness to pay for air travel from obtaining lower
airfares and allows the airlines to steal the valuable
consumer surplus that maximizes profits on a flight.
Three common restrictions that will be analyzed in
this paper are advance purchase, minimum stay, and
off-peak travel requirements. The effect of these
restrictions on passengers will be compared between
a highly price sensitive vacation traveler and a price
insensitive business traveler.
Advance purchase requirements necessitate
that passengers buy their tickets before a given date,
which can range from two weeks to a month before
the date of their flight. To passengers flying for
vacations this restriction is little trouble because
vacation time is usually known and planned out well
in advance. Yet for business passengers, these fares
are almost always unattainable because complete
travel itineraries are rarely known until a few days
before the business trip. Therefore, this restriction
ensures that vacationers obtain the limited number
of discounted seats for a given flight.
Discounted airfares also often contain a
minimum stay requirement for passengers. The
most common type of this restriction is that
passengers stay through Saturday night at their
destination before making their return flight. For a
vacationer this presents little trouble because their
vacation period extends typically over a weekend
and Sunday is the desired day to return home.
Conversely, a business traveler typically has fulfilled
the purpose of his or her trip during the week and is
very unwilling to waste their weekend away from
home in order to save on airfare. Thus, this
restriction serves to block business travelers from
obtaining lower fares.
The final restriction examined is the

requirement that passengers traveling on discount
tickets fly on off-peak flights. Since airlines
typically offer multiple numbers of flights over the
course of a day between two cities, some flights
generate greater demand than others. Flights with
high demand typically are during the week from
midmorning until early evening, thus these flights
are in the peak-demand periods. Conversely, the
off-peak period is either early in the morning, at
night, or during the weekend. Since the demand is
higher for peak flights, the airlines strictly limit the
number of discounted seats on these flights in order
to steal as much consumer surplus as possible. For
a vacationer, travel on off-peak flights would be seen
as a small hassle if it were necessary to save
significantly on the airfare. Yet for a business
traveler, off-peak travel creates too much travel
because his or her ultimate need is to their
destination as their schedule demands, which is
almost always during peak periods. Therefore, on
off-peak flights, a significant number of seats are
sold at discounted prices to provide for passengers
with a low willingness to pay.
B. Case Study: Atlanta and Delta Airlines
Now that the foundations have been laid for
understanding how the airlines effectively segment
their passengers, an analysis of three different routes
will demonstrate the use of price discrimination.
Delta Airlines will be used as the major airline for
analysis on three separate routes that all originate
in Atlanta. This choice was made because Delta
operates one of the largest single operations in
Atlanta of any airline in the world. Therefore, this
airport dominance allows Delta to hold monopolies
on many flights, which results in higher airfares.
By analyzing Delta’s flights from Atlanta to three
different cities where it faces varying levels of
competition, the dynamics of segmentation and price
discrimination become readily apparent.
The first flight for analysis is from Atlanta
to Little Rock, where Delta is the only airline
offering nonstop service. Figure 8 shows the various
fares offered to passengers on these flights. Delta
does offer two discounted and two standard fares
for the route. Notice that the discounted fares both
carry purchase restrictions requiring advance
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Figure 8: Atlanta to Little Rock Price Analysis

Fares
Offered

Cost

Advance Purchase
Requirements

Minimum Stay
Requirements

Flight
Limits

Discount
One

$392

Two Weeks

Through
Saturday

None

Discount
Two

$573

One Week

Through
Saturday

Weekend No
Travel

Standard
One

$786

N/A

N/A

N/A

Standard
Two

$1,074

N/A

N/A

N/A

purchase of either one or two weeks and do not allow
return flights until Sunday. Also, neither of the
discounted fares are refundable in the case of
cancellation. The advent of the yield management
system has allowed for consumers to obtain some
discounted airfares even though Delta holds a
monopoly on the route. The principle reason Delta
still offers discounted tickets lies in the fact that
selling them at discounted fares allows for each flight
to fly as close to its maximum capacity as possible.
This allows Delta to avoid the losses associated with
having empty seats on the flights for this route.

Refundable
No

Yes
Yes

Notice how the increase in airfares stays relatively
consistent at around $200 as the fare classes change
from discount to standard. Delta’s monopoly on
the flights between Atlanta and Little Rock does
not necessitate a lot of variability in fares to adjust
for the varying levels of each passenger’s willingness
to pay.
The next route for analysis is between
Charlotte and Atlanta, where Delta’s competition
is US Airways, which also is a major airline. Figure
9 lists the fares offered on this route. The effect of
competition causes increased variability in prices

Figure 9: Atlanta to Charlotte Price Analysis
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Fares
Offered

Cost

Advance Purchase
Requirements

Minimum Stay
Requirements

Flight
Limits

Discount
One

$198

Three Weeks

Through
Saturday

None

Discount
Two

$238

Two Weeks

Through
Saturday

None

Discount
Three

$438

One Week

None

None

Standard
One

$612

N/A

N/A

N/A

Standard
Two

$972

N/A

N/A

N/A
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than on the Atlanta to Little Rock route. Restrictions
on the discounted fares seem well placed to partition
passengers and allow for biased pricing to succeed.
Additionally, it is very likely that Delta and US
Airways both strictly limit the number of seats sold
at discounted fares. This allows each airline to
capture passengers with very low willingness to pay
and squeeze out more consumer surplus from the
less flexible in their travel needs.
The final route examined is from Atlanta to
Boston, which best demonstrates the practice of
market segmentation and price discrimination. The
primary reason for the wide dispersion in airfares
demonstrated in Figure 10, is that Delta competes
with the low-cost airline, Air Tran, on this route.
Just as the model developed in this paper predicted,
the effect of low-cost competition causes Delta to
segment and discriminatorily price against
passengers as much as possible. When Air Tran
began flying between these two cities, Delta had to
lower fares to Air Tran’s level in order to prevent
losing passengers. Therefore, Delta used the
principles of yield management to create the route’s
fare structure. There are five discounted fares on
the route, which are designed specifically to match
Air Tran’s fares. The low prices placed on these
fares allows Delta to obtain many of the highly price
sensitive passengers that would select Air Tran for
their travel needs if each airline charged only their
standard fare. Due to its higher costs, Delta’s
standard fare is much higher then Air Tran’s.
Therefore, Delta uses five sets of discounted fares
to compete with Air Tran for passengers with low
willingness to pay. Delta knows that by properly
restricting the fares the airline can prevent these fares
from resulting in high levels consumer surplus.
Discount Fares One through Three appear
to be targeted toward passengers traveling for the
purposes of leisure. The restrictions that allow this
to occur are the use of advance purchase
requirements and the limitations placed on what day
a passenger can select to travel. For business
travelers, the advance purchase requirements make
it especially difficult for them to obtain these lower
fares since they often do not know their travel
itineraries until the day before they need to leave.
Discount Fares Four and Five are designed to meet

the needs of business travelers with slight flexibility
in their travel needs. As indicated in Figure 10,
these fares only carry the restriction that travelers
use early morning and evening flights, which are
off-peak times of the day. This is less of a hassle to
travelers than requiring them to stay through
Saturday. The use of these discounted fares with
fewer restrictions seems to indicate that Delta wants
to take as many travelers as possible from Air Tran.
The huge jump in price from the discounted
to standard fares is due to the fact that on a given
flight Delta must make-up for the significant number
of discounted tickets sold by maximizing the price
that passengers that are insensitive to increases pay.
Delta is demonstrating exactly how a major airline
steals consumer surplus from the lower elastic group
of travelers. Compare the increase in price from
the highest discount fare to the lowest standard fare
on this route to this increase on the previous two
routes. On the Atlanta-Boston route the increase is
approximately 300%. However, on the previous
two routes, the increase from discount to standard
is only about 40%.
Passengers paying the standard fare are
obtaining benefits by paying these higher fares, such
as the ability to receive refunds for travel and,
perhaps most importantly, the flexibility to travel
on any one of Delta’s flights between Atlanta and
Boston. By providing more flights than Air Tran
between the two cities, Delta is able to obtain more
time-sensitive passengers who are willing to pay a
premium in order to get to where they need to go.
Delta’s tactics of yield management in this market
allow the airline to fend off competition from Air
Tran and still make profits by stealing consumer
surplus from price insensitive passengers.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Airline pricing was drastically changed by
the influx of low-cost airlines brought by
deregulation and the creation of computer
reservation systems. The revolutionary concept of
varied pricing according to demand is one of the
sole reasons that the major airlines were able to fend
off the low-cost airlines and increase their
dominance of the nation’s air transportation needs.
Deregulation has made air travel affordable for a
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much larger portion of the population.
The prime purpose of this paper was to serve
as an overview of the events that lead to the creation
of the pricing system used in air travel today.
Although airfares seem to change so chaotically, the
system itself can be seen quite simply as evolving
from the major airlines need to segment each
customer based on their willingness to pay for travel.
Once this is determined from computer reservation
systems, the airline simply follows through by
discriminatorily pricing to steal consumer surplus.
Understanding how the airlines develop their price
structure can allow for passengers to obtain low
airfares.
A key policy implication that this paper
makes apparent is that businesses should seek
alternative methods to conduct transactions rather
than through using air travel. Essentially finding
alternatives to air travel will causes airlines to lose
out on their most critical customers for producing

revenue. As the information technology revolution
continues, it may become more conceivable for
business to be conducted through teleconferencing
rather than in-person. As a result, the airlines will
have to stop discriminating against business travelers
in order to keep them flying. This will signify a
major change in the strategy that airlines use to price.
Other technological advances such as the growth of
internet travel bookings signify that the airlines must
upgrade their pricing methods into the 21st century.
Nevertheless, market segmentation and price
discrimination tactics have played a significant role
in assuring the continued dominance of major
airlines.
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Fares
Offered

Cost

Advance Purchase
Requirements

Minimum Stay
Requirements

Flight
Limits

Discount
One

$138

Two Weeks

Through
Saturday

Midweek
Evening

No

Discount
Two

$ 19 8

One Week

None

Midweek
Evening

No

Discount
Three
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3 days

None

Evening
Return

No

Discount
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Morn. And No
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Morning
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N/A

N/A

Standard
Two
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N/A

N/A

N/A
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N/A

The Park Place Economist / vol. VIII

Refundable

No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Understanding the Chaos of Airline Pricing
Dempsey, Paul and Goetz, Andrew. Airline
Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology.
Quorum: Westport, 1992.
Glab, James and Peterson, Barbara. Rapid
Descent. Simon & Schuster: New York,
1994.
Mansfield, Edwin. Microeconomics. W.W.
Norton: New York, 1997.
Morrison, Steven and Winston, Clifford. The
Evolution of the Airline Industry. Brookings
Institute: Washington DC, 1995.
O’Conner, William. An Introduction to Airline
Economics. Praeger: Westport, 1995.
Williams, George. The Airline Industry and the
Impact of Deregulation. Ashgate: Brookfield,
1994.
Borenstein, Severin and Rose, Nancy. “Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline
Industry.” Journal of Political Economy 102.4
(1994): 653-683.

Botimer, Theodore. “Efficiency Considerations in
Airline Pricing and Yield Management.”
Transportation Research 30.4 (1996): 307315.
Fredrick, Benjamin. “Understanding Airline
Pricing.” Working Woman 20.4 (1995): 3134.
LaCroix, Sumner. “Airline Coupons and Pricing
Adjustments.” Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy 18.3 (1984): 253-262.
Peteraf, Margaret. “Intra-Industry Structure and
the Response towards Rivals.”
Managerial and Decision Economics 14.6
(1993): 519-528.
Department of Transportation. “The Low Cost
Airline Service Revolution.” Online.
Internet. September 20 1999. Available URL:
http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation
Yahoo Travel. Yahoo! November 11 1999.
Available URL: http://www.yahoo.com

The Park Place Economist / vol. VIII

29

